On a weekday morning in late September, an hour and a half from Tokyo off a side-road close to the city of Sakura, the ticket queue for the Kawamura Memorial DIC Museum of Artwork is lengthy. Automobiles wait alongside a cedar-lined lane for a spot within the second overflow car parking zone. The present store has been so overwhelmed by prospects in latest days that administration has shut its doorways. By 11:45am, the digital display screen outdoors the museum’s Belvedere Italian restaurant declares the ready time for a desk is now 181 minutes; a particular discover on the web site recommends bringing a packed lunch as a substitute.
The museum has mentioned it would shut in early 2025, and hundreds of artwork lovers, of their stampede to the Chiba countryside, can sense an emergency. Massive components of company Japan can sense one thing far, much more alarming.
The unfolding saga of this comparatively obscure museum — and of the lots of of artworks owned by the listed chemical compounds firm behind it — can be an unfolding saga of company Japan and what model of shareholder capitalism the nation as an entire needs to topic itself to. A belated reckoning now appears to be like to be rearing again up from the murky late Nineteen Eighties, when banks inspired Japanese firm founders to borrow wildly in opposition to what had been then hovering home actual property values.
It’s a first, probably trailblazing occasion of an organization revealing the extent of its artwork assortment underneath explicitly governance-driven stress. Of the 754 works within the Kawamura assortment, 384 are owned by DIC — just about the entire most well-known works belong to the corporate and thus their possession is now caught in an ideological limbo.

One argument — now extra visibly gathering steam as Japanese firms are held to ever greater requirements by their traders — is that artwork is just an asset of an organization that they, the shareholders personal, and ought to be handled like some other asset.
The counter is that nevertheless compelling the argument above, firms have a wider societal perform than merely service to shareholders, and that their asset portfolios ought to be assessed accordingly. That very same argument holds that Japan, as an entire, has benefited from this a lot broader interpretation, and could be the poorer if every thing had been subjected to the arduous guidelines of shareholder capitalism. The talk, raging across the huge expanse of “non-core” belongings and enterprise ventures maintained by Japanese firms, is now on the coronary heart of a tectonic structural shift.
One of many nation’s most beautiful soiled secrets and techniques — the ambiguous possession of extremely priceless artwork, the exploitation of listed firms to guard generational wealth and recurring asset-mingling between households and public firms — has damaged the floor after mendacity comparatively undisturbed for many years. On this occasion, it has been uncovered by Oasis Administration, a notoriously catalytic shareholder activist. However it’s a part of a broader, inexorable-looking development.
“Japanese firms had been instructed they had been value billions. It was humorous cash, in order that they did humorous issues,” says Toby Rodes of Kaname Capital, a fund supervisor whose technique consists of delving into the artwork collections hidden on the Tokyo inventory market, utilizing their existence as a sign of extra profound governance shortcomings.
There isn’t any explicit allegation that something unlawful has taken place — merely that the Japanese market has been supernaturally tolerant of blurred traces. In his explicit concentrate on artwork, Rodes is a rarity, however the hunt for governance failures and the potential returns that include repairing these has attracted scores of activist and worth funds to Japan.

Not the entire shopping for within the late Nineteen Eighties and early Nineteen Nineties was ostentatious. However the escapades that the period fuelled grew to become the stuff of legend. Japanese firm bosses — in some instances with chapter lurking fairly quickly of their future — set jaw-dropping data for purchases of Van Gogh’s “Sunflowers”, Renoir’s “Bal du moulin de la Galette”, Picasso’s “Les Noces de Pierrette” and lots of different gems.
The bursting of the bubble triggered a quiet, bad-debted and, to many, face-losing outflow of Japan’s artwork all through the downturn of the late Nineteen Nineties. Some cases, such because the efforts to hint the whereabouts of Van Gogh’s “Portrait of Dr Gachet” after it fell into the arms of collectors, have been multi-decade worldwide mysteries. However these outflows weren’t, by any means, a full clearance sale. Throughout company Japan, main works amassed within the heyday nonetheless loom over the rarefied exclusivity of boardrooms.
It’s a topic about which only a few within the art-dealing world like to speak on the document; actually because they now see that governance enhancements in Japan and the enforcement of transparency on listed firms may really flood “misplaced” artwork on to an illiquid market, and reveal extra of its murky previous.
$500mn (¥74bn)Estimated worth of DIC’s Kawamura Rothko assortment
¥11.2bnDIC’s formal guide worth for its total artwork assortment
The place is it now? Funds and artwork specialists suspect that an unknowable trove, technically owned by listed firms, has made its method into the non-public properties of their founders or the founders’ descendants. Masterpieces virtually definitely sit, undeclared, in company-owned warehouses across the nation, artwork sellers say. VIP guests to the Tokyo headquarters of Nomura could discover themselves sitting at a desk with a Monet at one finish and a Chagall on the different. Particular company of Marubeni could catch a glimpse of Botticelli’s “La Bella Simonetta”.
“I’ll always remember once I stumbled throughout a ‘museum’ that doubled as the chief flooring of a Japanese broadcaster,” mentioned one veteran US-based fund supervisor. “Being shielded from a change of management by authorized regulation, the entrenched administration crew had a penchant for very advantageous artworks. The crew escorting me to the elevator after a gathering obtained nervous once I paused in entrance of a Cézanne.”
Now, in an period when pressing company governance reforms are being ordered by each the Japanese authorities and Tokyo Inventory Alternate, when higher transparency is being demanded and shareholder activism has grow to be extra emboldened, the controversy round these belongings threatens a painful rethink of Japan’s relationship between firms, their founders, society and shareholders.


Regardless of its considerably awkward location within the sticks, the Kawamura Memorial museum, elegantly constructed on the finish of Japan’s Nineteen Eighties bubble period and set in gardens dotted with a Henry Moore and different sculptures, has loads to justify a go to. Some would argue, excessively so: a monetary anomaly hiding in plain sight for many years.
The gathering was assembled by the founding household of the Dainippon Ink and Chemical compounds Company (DIC) from the Seventies. No matter it lacks in thematic coherence it greater than makes up for in beautiful reminders of simply how acquisitive Japan grew to become on the peak of its monetary powers.
It’s no coincidence that the museum opened in 1990 — the yr by which, in accordance with FT knowledge evaluation, imports of work to Japan hit an all-time peak of just about ¥500bn ($3.3bn), or greater than 10 instances greater than in 1985. By 1992, the worth had plummeted once more to ¥34bn ($229mn).
Contained in the museum’s softly lit galleries cling works by Matisse, Chagall, Ernst, Monet, Picasso and Renoir. There’s a exceptional Pollock, two works by Twombly and a particular alcove housing Rembrandt’s “Portrait of a Man in a Broad-Brimmed Hat”.


However Kawamura’s most precious show-stopper is upstairs, in a devoted room walled with seven panels by Mark Rothko, from a group initially painted for the 4 Seasons restaurant in New York’s Seagram Constructing. The massive works are extensively seen as a part of a very powerful fee Rothko ever undertook. The public sale document for only one Rothko portray stands at $86.9mn. In line with artwork specialists consulted by traders, those in Kawamura may, collectively, be value effectively over half a billion {dollars}.
Regardless of the qualities of this extraordinary assortment, it has been on show right here for 34 years with out ever producing greater than a modest stream of holiday makers at a median price of just some hundred folks a day.
However on August 27 the board of indebted, unprofitable DIC, which owns the museum and far of the artwork inside, made a shock announcement. Due to the connection between the corporate and the museum, and due to the “opinions expressed by traders”, mentioned the assertion, it had now grow to be impracticable to keep up and function the museum in its present state. The museum, it declared, will “quickly shut” from January 2025. It then, on September 30, despatched out a second discover saying that it will postpone the closure till March 2025 “making an allowance for customer numbers” since its earlier discover.

Crucially, although, the DIC assertion addressed one of many nice enigmas which have hung, completely, over the museum. Till now, the corporate has by no means specified how a lot of the artwork it shows in its museum it really owns, and the way a lot is owned by the household. It has, accordingly, not ascribed a exact market-to-market worth to the artwork within the revealed accounts.
However in its August 27 assertion the corporate got here partially clear. Of the 754 works within the assortment, it mentioned, 384 are owned by the corporate — and thus, activists would argue, by the shareholders. DIC put a proper guide worth of simply Y11.2bn ($77mn) on the corporate’s artwork — a particularly low reckoning of its potential worth had been the artwork to come back on to the market.
A number of issues have occurred since that bombshell. The primary is that many Japanese have seen the information, panicked that the times of an excellent nationwide treasure are actually numbered — though most had not beforehand bothered to go to — and determined that they have to trek over there of their hundreds. A second is that the choice has been vehemently challenged. Outstanding “DON’T CLOSE IT!” indicators have popped up alongside the roads across the museum, and an internet petition in opposition to the closure appeared on the native municipality’s web site. As of final weekend, it had greater than 47,000 signatures.
The third and arguably most life-changing impact for Japan has been to focus the eye of traders on what number of different DICs there could also be lurking across the nation. Hedge funds that now specialise on this kind of socially fraught treasure hunt, and have spoken to the FT over latest months, suspect that there are dozens of firms listed on the Tokyo Inventory Alternate that bear a detailed resemblance.
The background to DIC’s determination to shut the museum was greater than a decade within the making. The nation’s first governance code setting finest apply for firms was launched in 2015, and was accompanied by a stewardship code that set out the obligations on traders to carry firms’ managements to account. Since then, the state of affairs has begun to alter. Firms have progressively begun to lift governance requirements, even once they haven’t totally accepted the premise of shareholder primacy. Effectively-known shareholder activists, equivalent to ValueAct Capital and Elliott, have centered closely on the alternatives in Japan, whereas smaller funds, equivalent to Oasis, 3D and the group headed by Yoshiaki Murakami, have managed to run a sequence of hard-hitting campaigns.
There was — and nonetheless is — an excellent deal to repair. Japanese boards weren’t numerous, had been very not often managed or overseen by a majority of impartial administrators, and shareholder activism was decried as a barbaric western apply. This, in impact, conferred big freedom on the managements of listed firms to run them as they happy, relatively than extra immediately within the pursuits of shareholders.
To doubly safe their freedom, Japanese firms created nice networks of shareholdings in different, pleasant listed firms on the understanding that these blocs of shares would by no means vote in opposition to administration.
And to triple-lock it in, Japanese firms constructed a collective narrative that they existed for the next function than merely increasing shareholder worth and maximising earnings. Lengthy earlier than BlackRock’s Larry Fink reversed years of funding dogma and commenced urging a extra accountable recalibration of company focus and a broader definition of company “function”, Japanese firms had been comfortably citing their grander function and sense of obligation to a number of stakeholders. They’ve argued, forcefully, that Japanese society has benefited from this, irrespective of how inefficiently they’ve deployed capital.
An apparent query, now requested with ever extra frequency and consequence, is why ought to so many — 3,951 on the final rely — Japanese firms be listed in any respect, given the lengths they’ve gone to keep away from the buildings, scrutiny and potential stress that comes with being listed?


A number of can see the governance writing on the wall. Inside the previous yr, the managements of two firms nonetheless carefully tied to their founding households have determined to undertake administration buyouts and de-list from the alternate — away from activists, governance strictures and the final scrutiny now in prospect. They’re Benesse, the training firm whose founding household established the well-known Benesse Artwork Web site on Naoshima island, and Taisho Pharmaceutical, whose founding household’s artwork is displayed within the Uehara Museum and embody works by Cézanne, Renoir and Corot.
“The frequent thread [is that] each firm founders are artwork collectors and had been seemingly feeling the stress of needing to come back clear on the conflicts of curiosity and poor governance that put the artwork on the partitions,” mentioned one non-public fairness govt in Tokyo who is aware of of not less than half a dozen different firms considering an identical transfer.
The important thing to understanding what is occurring, says Rodes, co-founder of Kaname Capital, is Japan’s lengthy historical past with extraordinarily excessive ranges of inheritance tax — a levy of round 50 per cent on massive estates that may, in principle, wipe out household wealth over a number of generations.
Some of the well-liked methods to cope with this was for households to record their firms and maintain on to vital stakes in order that there was all the time a cache of shares that could possibly be liquidated to pay the taxman. The inventory market, in that mild, has been abused as a method of securing generational wealth, relatively than as a mechanism for rising good firms. Households would preserve their management over the listed firms’ boards by putting in beneficial administrators.
Due to this extraordinarily frequent sample, say Rodes and others, households got here to see the stability sheets of listed firms as, in impact, their very own asset. It was a essential psychological leap that lies proper on the coronary heart of the company governance issues that traders are actually shining the brightest of lights upon.
“Trying on the artwork collections is a method of bringing unhealthy governance to the floor,” says Rodes. “It’s our method of claiming, ‘We all know what you probably did’. Artwork is the governance sledgehammer. Might the businesses do extra with these notoriously illiquid belongings? Completely.”
Joji Kaneko, a customer to the Kawamura museum who has travelled greater than 400km by automotive from Nagoya, is now admiring a wall of artwork by Frank Stella. “I’m right here as a result of I’ve heard that this museum goes to shut in January and this could possibly be my final likelihood to see every thing right here,” Kaneko says. “It’s a tragic factor, however I suppose it’s simply one thing that may’t be helped. Cash all the time wins in these conditions, doesn’t it?”
Really helpful
The assertion by DIC by which it introduced the closure of its museum referred to “the opinions of traders” — euphemistically, the questions raised by sure shareholders, together with Oasis Administration, round whether or not the company possession of artwork will be justified when the corporate is closely indebted and the Tokyo Inventory Alternate itself is looking for listed firms to display higher capital effectivity.
Past the well mannered protest posters outdoors the Kawamura museum, there’s a low-level outrage that shareholders ought to be capable to drive firms to behave in a different way than they’ve achieved previously. However change is within the air.
“Proudly owning artwork and pretending you’re doing God’s work is loopy. Boards can now not fake there’s nothing to see right here,” says Rodes.
Leo Lewis is the FT’s Tokyo bureau chief. Extra reporting by Dan Clark
Discover out about our newest tales first — comply with FT Weekend on Instagram and X, and subscribe to our podcast Life & Artwork wherever you pay attention